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Theory of Moral Sentiments 1759 vs. Theory of Moral Sentiments 1790: 
 
A Change of Mind or a Change in Constraint? 
 
   Maria Pia Paganelli  
 
 
 
The 1790 edition of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments presents sig- 
nificant changes from the 1759 edition. In the 1790 edition Smith seems crit- 
ical of the moral consequences of commerce. By focusing exclusively on the 
approbation generated by showing off material possession, I propose that the 
1790 edition is just an updated edition of the1759, and does not represent a 
change of mind Smith had.  Writing The Wealth of Nations Smith realizes the 
constraints in poor pre-commercial societies are different from the constraints 
in rich commercial societies and therefore behaviors and consequences will 
differ. The apparent contrast between the two editions of Theory of Moral 
Sentiments can therefore be interpreted as only apparent. 
(J.E.L.: B12, B31, P0) 
 
The name of Adam Smith is more often than not associated with The Wealth 
of nations (Wn). But his first book was The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). 
The place of TMS in the literature on Smith is problem- atic. When it was first 
published, TMS was a success. Then, for a long time, TMS tended to be 
disregarded as an uninteresting book. But ignoring TMS to concentrate on Wn did 
not erase TMS from the list of Smith’s work. indeed, in recent years, TMS has been 
(re)discovered and its richness is now being (re)appreciated. 
laurence Dickey (1986) is one of many who analyze how the relation between 
Smith’s two books is treated in the literature (see also Montes 2004 and Peters-
Fransen 2000). Dickey claims that the “The Adam Smith Problem”, the problem of 
the consistency or lack of thereof between Wn and TMS, can take at least four 
forms. in one approach, TMS and Wn are two separate and non reconcilable entities 
– this is the Adam Smith Problem traditionally understood (Oncken 1897). in a 
second approach, TMS swallows Wn, with Wn being like a long footnote to TMS – 
this is the approach exemplified by A.l. Macfie and D.D. raphael (1984). in the 
third approach, à la 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Viner (1927), Wn and its system of natural liberty is the major focus of Smith’s 
attention, and TMS just sits close by, in Wn’s shadow, as an additional source of 
support. The fourth approach, the one of Dickey himself, considers “three rather 
than one or two motivating centers” (587); one center is Wn, the other one is TMS 
1759 (TMS 1st-5th edition), and the third one is TMS 1790 (TMS 6th  edition), the 
edition finalized after the completion of Wn and with major changes. 
With this paper, i address Dickey’s challenge, showing that Wn, TMS 
1759 and even TMS 1790 are consistent with each other. i do not compare the three 
books as a whole, or the entirety of their themes, approaches, styles, focuses, etc. 
rather, i slice one common issue out of TMS 1759, Wn, and TMS 1790 and 
compare its treatment in the three books. My conclusion is that TMS 1759 and TMS 
1790 are one and the same book, and they are a book which is not in contradiction 
with Wn. in their differences, they are intertwined, complemented and strengthened 
by each other. 
The single common thread i follow is the approbation gained from having 
material possessions, an issue covered both in TMS (1759 and 1790) and in Wn. By 
focusing exclusively on the approbation generated by showing off material 
possession, i propose that Wn and TMS can be read as a symbiotic relation in 
which neither book has dominance over the other, and that TMS 
1790 is just an updated edition of TMS 1759, not a different book. i propose that all 
four approaches to the problem summarized by Dickey have some validity, but none 
of them is complete by itself. Similarly to Macfie and raphael’s approach of seeing 
Wn as the applied version of TMS, i see TMS (1759 and 1790) as the “theory” 
book and Wn as the “practice” book. But differently from them, i do not see Wn as 
a simple application of TMS and its consequent lack of autonomy – i think that one 
feeds off the other. To bet- ter understand “practice” we need a “theory”, and to have 
a good “theory”, we need a “practice”. As proposed by the original formulation of 
the Adam Smith Problem, one book stands independent from the other but, at the 
same time, in contrast to that reading, combining the two (or three) makes a better 
and stronger case, rather than generating an incoherent picture. 
if we look at the approbation generated by material possession in the three-center 
Adam Smith Problem of TMS 1759, TMS 1790 and Wn that Dickey presents as 
well as to original Adam Smith Problem, we may get to opposite conclusions. in 
TMS 1759, approbation from material possessions seems to generate a moral and 
prosperous individual and society – in TMS 
1790, less so. But in Wn, that same desire for approbation is described as a 
potentially destabilizing force for individuals and society, not always bringing 
prosperity or morality. TMS 1759, and even TMS 1790, seem to present a more 
favorable account of this form of self-interest than Wn, which may sound counter-
intuitive given some of the previous expositions of the Adam Smith Problem. 
  
 
 
 
On the other hand, if TMS (1759 and 1790) and Wn are somehow read together, 
in terms of theory and practice, the contradiction is only apparent, and we can see 
the same approbation, and the same consequences of it, in all three books. TMS 
describes the general mechanism through which man gains approbation – a 
combination of moral and material approbation – and in Wn, the same principle 
works in a world where the amount of wealth and the involvement of government in 
the economy change. The constraints that the individual faces in Wn change, and 
they are meant to change given the historical narrations of Wn. But a change in 
constraints changes the observed behaviors. The individual actions and their 
consequences are therefore going to be different depending on what constraint the 
individual faces. in Wn, indeed, the more prosperous a society is and the more a 
government grants monopoly powers, the more incentives there are to rely on wealth 
to receive approbation and the higher is the risk that individual would dismiss moral 
conduct to achieve that wealth. Actually, it is only in Wn, when Smith describes 
societies with increasing commerce, wealth, and government- granted monopolies, 
that the consequences of the natural desire of approbation generate the potential ruin 
of some individuals, as well as the socially disastrous mercantilist policies, rather 
than the betterment of the individual and of his society (Paganelli 2009). 
The treatment of approbation in one book can stand independently from the 
exposition of it in the other book. But at the same time, combining them makes a 
much better and stronger case. if we look at the revisions that Smith makes, rather 
than seeing the Adam Smith Problem with three centers à la Dickey, with the 6th 
edition of TMS being the major source of the Problem, we can see the feedback 
mechanism often present when theories are put into practice and practices are 
analyzed through theories. The theory is updated, given some practical results. 
Updating is not changing. The general idea still holds. But now we are able to 
account for the “difficult” cases as well as for the general case. Seen in these terms, 
what may look like contradicting results is in fact conciliated as the two faces of the 
same coin. 
The paper develops as follows. The next section describes the theoretical 
mechanism through which one can gain approbation as presented in TMS. The 
following section illustrates the practical consequences of acting in a world with 
“politics, revenue, and arms” as described in Wn. Concluding remarks end the 
paper. 
 
 
Approbation in TMS 
 
in  TMS  1759,  Smith  explains  how  approbation  works.  Approbation comes 
from two different channels: an appropriate moral conduct and the social status 
associated with the possession of wealth. 
The approbation generated from appropriate moral conduct generally 
  
 
 
gives us incentives to behave morally as well as, unintentionally, to generate moral 
rules of conduct that are the embodiment of behaviors that give moral approbation 
(Muller 1995).  rules of appropriate moral conduct come from the habit of 
“adjusting the pitch of our passions” to the level we think others would show if they 
were in our place (TMS iii.i-iii). We want to “adjust the pitch of our passions” to 
what we think the expectations of others are, because one approves the presence in 
others of the same feeling that one has (TMS i.i.2.1 and i.ii)1. 
Additionally, the desire to be approved of is also fulfilled by the visible 
accumulation of wealth. And indeed, the reason why men accumulate wealth is to 
receive the approbation of others (TMS i.iii.2.1). Wealth is a visible and easily 
distinguishable sign of distinction. The more wealth one has, the more attention he 
attracts, and the more approbation he gains. Furthermore, the approbation deriving 
from possessing fortunes is strengthened by the process through which the fortune is 
accumulated. He who wants to pursue “wealth and greatness” will gain not only the 
approbation granted to possessors of wealth, but also the admiration and the esteem 
of the observers when he acts in a morally appropriate way (TMS iV. 2.8). 
Our desire to be approved therefore can have positive consequences for the 
individual – individuals can both learn how to be virtuous and moral and can gain 
material fortune. Under these circumstances, the positive consequences of the desire 
to gain approbation at the individual level extend to the social level as well. The 
desire to gain approbation drives man not only to generate rules of moral conduct 
but also to transform natural challenges into useful things (TMS, iV.1: 9-10). 
TMS 1759 therefore describes how approbation generates positive out- comes 
both for the individual and for society. Dickey claims that TMS 1790 is a different 
book from TMS 1759 because Smith changes his mind, among other things, 
regarding what approbation from material possession can do. Holding constant the 
effects of approbation due to moral behaviors, Smith introduces some potential 
negative effects of our desire for approbation achieved through accumulation and 
parade of riches in i.iii.3 and in part Vi, all added in the last edition. But even with 
these considerations, if one reads TMS by itself, approbation does not seem to 
generate major negative material consequences for individual or society, especially 
when compared to what Wn portrays. 
Smith describes the potential negative consequences of the desire for approbation 
from wealth accumulation in TMS 1790, in a chapter titled “Of 
 
 
 
 
1 For a recent attempt to formally model it, see Khalil 2005. For Smith the 
development of fellow-feelings is an imperfect process, the accuracy of which 
decreases as social distance increases. 
  
 
the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to 
admire the rich and the great and to despise or neglect the persons of poor and mean 
condition” (i.iii. 3). Here Smith notices that the greater admiration for men of fortune 
may induce individuals to take great moral risks (TMS i.iii. 3.8). if the results of the 
morally questionable actions are positive, they gain the approbation from the higher 
level of wealth, and their immoral misbehavior will be ignored. Similarly, in Part Vi 
of TMS we find that reproachable behaviors generate great admiration when the 
resulting gains are great, while they generate contempt if the gains are “petty” 
(TMS Vi.i. 
16: 217). What Smith is telling us, then, is that we are willing to gamble moral 
approbation for wealth approbation. We are willing to give up moral approbation if 
we think that we can gain a lot of material approbation. The higher is the gain in 
material approbation, the more we will be willing to risk in terms of moral 
approbation. 
This is not surprising given that material possessions are easier to recognize, and 
therefore approve, than moral (mis)behaviors (TMS i.iii. 3.4). Thus, given the high 
recognizability of wealth and the difficulties with which virtue is distinguished from 
morally questionable behaviors, we tend to rely more on wealth than on morality 
when we give approbation to others (TMS Vi.ii.1. 
20). Similarly, we rely more on wealth than on morality when we seek approbation 
from others. The frequency of moral gambles is even less surprising when one 
considers that in Wn Smith claims that people systematically over- estimate their 
probability of success and underestimate their probability of failure. gambling 
morality does not seem too different from gambling for- tunes through a lottery or 
(lack of) insurance (Wn, i.x.b)2. 
A couple of considerations are relevant here. First, despite the possible 
disillusion at the end of one’s life, the anxiety, and the infamy of a dirty con- science 
of an individual (TMS i.iii.3.8), the consequences of trading off moral approbation 
for material gains at the social level do not appear to be devastating3. Second, the 
ease with which one is willing to give up moral approbation for material approbation 
depends on the amount of material gains one makes. The larger the material gain, 
the more likely one is willing to behave in morally disappovable ways. 
if one stops here, two contradictions emerge, like the ones Dickey points to. First, 
Smith changed his mind from TMS 1759 to TMS 1790, because now approbation 
from moral possession has high costs, not just high bene- 
 
 
 
 
 
2 For an analysis of the consequences of overestimation of the probability of success 
in the loanable funds market in Smith see Paganelli 2003. 
3  Even factions, where local moral approbation is favored over the general good, do 
not seem to be a seri- ous or permanent threat (TMSTMS Vi.ii.2.13-14, Vi.iii.12.19-
20). 
  
 
fits. Second, despite these differences within the various editions of TMS, in TMS 
the consequences of gaining approbation through the accumulation of wealth remain, 
generally, positive. The disruptive consequences of gambling morality for material 
wealth remain on a private and moral level. The end result is still, generally, a 
betterment of an individual’s material condition as well as of his society. This, 
however, is not always the case in Wn, where pursuing approbation through 
material possessions has more ambiguous con- sequences, being dependent on how 
rich society is. in Wn Smith is frazzled about how disruptive the consequence of 
pursuing material approbation can be, if a society is rich. But he is not, if the society 
is not rich. 
What i propose here is that these differences are not due to a different perspective 
or a different motivation at the base of human behavior. They are simply due to the 
development of an awareness of differences in the constraints that individuals face. 
Wn introduces differences in the environment in which an individual operates. The 
mechanisms are the same, but the out- comes are different if we are in a poor society 
or in a rich society, as the incentives in these different environments vary. TMS 1790 
accounts for the possibilities of differences in the constraints within the same model, 
differences which were overlooked in TMS 1759. 
let us see how Smith explains how approbation works in the real world, in a 
world with “police, revenue, and arms”, as described in Wn. 
 
 
Approbation in WN 
 
Wn is well known, correctly, for the idea that pursuing one’s interest to better 
oneself would generate not only individual prosperity, but also social prosperity. 
There is no need to restate this argument here. Yet, contrary to what is often 
presumed, Wn does not always match the depicted picture or the optimism present 
in TMS. in Wn, the people “whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition” are 
not always gaining social status and benefiting society. Smith, in Wn,  talks about 
unambiguously ruinous consequences both for individuals and for society when the 
desire for approbation meets the enormous commercial fortunes. Wn indeed 
describes how consequences of our desire for approbation may potentially become 
increasingly negative as society becomes richer. When a society is poor, there is not 
much to show off and not much to gain with questionable behaviors. But the wealth 
of a rich society generates perverse incentives that may lead to the ruin of the 
individual or of society itself. if read in isolation, the analysis for approbation in Wn 
is sound, yet dark (Paganelli 2008). 
Wn has a first explanation of how we are willing to gamble away moral- ly 
approvable behaviors to gain material fortune in its account of wage determination in 
book 1 chapter 10. David levy (1999) highlights how large changes in money are 
able to change one person’s rank and the social approbation 
  
 
that comes with it. People are therefore willing to take large risks, such as attempting to 
succeed in some very competitive professions, to try to improve their material status. 
The trading off of moral approbation for material application under different 
constraints is explicit in Wn ii.iii.38-42. Here Smith describes how every man 
suffers from a “base and selfish disposition.” When the wealth and the riches of 
commerce and manufactures are introduced, they bring along durable goods, such as 
“frivolous trinkets.” Spending on durable goods is more directed toward oneself than 
toward others. The “selfish disposition” in us is unleashed with morally questionably 
behaviors. indeed “where he can spend the greatest revenue upon his own person, he 
frequently has no bound to his expense, because he frequently has no bounds to his 
vanity, or to his affection for his own person” (Wn iii.iv.16). This “base and selfish 
disposition” is present even in poor non-commercial societies. But because there is 
very little on which to gratify one’s “most childish vanity,” the temptations of human 
“folly” are less and weaker. indeed when a man can spend his fortune only on 
consumption goods, such as sumptuous meals and numerous servants, his “selfish 
disposition” is well constrained. When spending one’s for- tune implies spending on 
others as well as on oneself, as consumption goods usually imply, only very few 
people will go bankrupt. This is the case in “nations to whom commerce and 
manufactures are little known” (Wn iii.iv.5).  indeed, Smith repeats, in non-
commercial societies “seldom [one has temptations] so violent as to attempt to 
maintain more than he can afford” (Wn iii.iv.16). 
The increase of wealth, changing the constraints, increases the incentives for 
reckless behavior. The glitter of wealth blinds prudence. The negative consequences 
will also be more severe. With the introduction of commercial wealth, indeed, 
individual ruin becomes more common, as individual behavior becomes less 
prudent. Proprietors are willing to sell their birthrights in exchange “for a pair of 
diamond buckles … for the gratification of the most childish, the meanest and the 
most sordid of all vanities, they gradually bartered their whole power and authority” 
(Wn iii.iv. 10-15). They think that they would gain approbation by showing off their 
unique trinkets, even if they lose moral approbation because of their sordid, childish 
and vain behaviors. They think they are “bettering their condition” by buying 
“trinkets and baubles.” in reality, by so doing, they are bound to become poor. True, 
this drive for approbation is the cause of the dismantling of feudal institutions— 
which is a good thing for society (rosenberg 1968, rosenberg 1990). But the “folly” 
and the gratification of “the most childish vanity” tear away the stability of land 
property and generations of family riches, and bring individuals and their families to 
ruin (Wn iii.iv.16-17: 422). 
When the same change in constraints is faced by the sovereign, differences in 
behavior are parallel. The consequences, though, are felt not just at 
  
 
the individual level but at the societal level as well. Smith explains: “The 
ignorance of the times [among nations to whom commerce and manufactures are 
little known] affords but few of the trinkets in which that finery consists […]. in a 
commercial country abounding with every sort of expensive luxury, the sovereign, in 
the same manner as almost all the great proprietors in his dominions, naturally spends 
a great part of his revenue in purchasing those luxuries. His own and the 
neighbouring countries supply him abundantly with all the costly trinkets which 
compose the splendid, but insignificant pageantry of a court” (Wn V.iii. 2-3). And 
since the sovereign will spend his revenue on futile things when there is peace, when 
war comes, he will go into debt. Unfortunately, “[t]he progress of the enormous debts 
which at present oppress, and will in the long run probably ruin, all the great nations 
of Europe, has been pretty uniform” (Wn V.iii. 10). Even if Smith is not very 
preoccupied by it, the ruin of a country is a possible threat of commercial society 
caused by the possibilities that commerce itself offers. 
The change in constraints that commercial society brings about is also felt at the 
policy level. Merchants and manufacturers, in their desire to improve their image in 
the eyes of others, now have opportunities to do so in a grand manner. The wealth 
generated by commerce is unprecedented and can be concentrated in their hands, if 
only the government grants them monopolies. Merchants and manufacturers are 
willing to take the moral tradeoff – to increase their fortune and status at the expense 
of the rest of society; they are willing to elbow their way over their competitors, 
even if these are reproach- able behaviors, because with monopoly power, they will 
gain much wealth and approbation. The increase in personal wealth brings an 
increase in social approbation sufficient to outweigh any possible disapprobation for 
the meth- ods used to achieve it. in Wn, given the perverse incentives that large 
commercial wealth can create, the social consequences of our desire for approbation 
can be devastating (Evensky 2005). Mercantilist policies deform, distort, and 
impoverish society (Wn  iV.viii.c.  43; i.xi.  p.10, iV.i.  10, iV.ii.  38, iV.iii.c: 9-
10). Merchants and manufacturers are able to extort ferocious laws from the 
legislature (Wn iV.viii. 17; iV.ii. 43; iV.viii. 53). 
The wealth of commercial societies changes the constraints that individuals face. 
When the possibilities to gain approbation from wealth are large enough, they 
may incentivize more morally questionable actions and generate potentially 
disastrous consequences. it is after this realization that TMS 
1790 is changed. Behaviors and their consequences differ under different levels of 
wealth. This change in constraints has to be accounted for in the theoretical 
description of approbation. The model remains the same. it is just updated, given a 
case not previously considered, to account for all the circumstances. 
  
Conclusions 
Focusing on a single common issue among TMS 1759, TMS 1790 and Wn may 
help us better understand the relationship between the books and the different 
editions of TMS. looking at approbation deriving from material possession suggests 
that TMS (1759 and 1790) and Wn are two distinct books, each standing alone on its 
own feet, yet feeding off the other. TMS can be interpreted as the “theory” book – the 
book containing the positive description of the mechanism through which 
approbation works – and Wn as the “practice” book—the book that looks at how 
man lives in a world with “police, revenue, and arms”, where the level of wealth 
changes through time, and where the government is a concrete player of tangible 
force. 
The same desire to gain the approbation of others motivates the man of 
TMS 1759, the man of Wn, and the man of TMS 1790. But while in TMS 
1759 the desire of approbation does make, generally, the individual and society better 
off, in Wn this result is questioned, and the desire to gain approbation is described 
as potentially generating individual and social disruption. This is not because the two 
books are inconsistent with each other, but rather because one book has individuals 
facing the different and changing constraints of a world of “police, revenue, and 
arms” and the other one, describing a theoretical model, does not. The additions in 
TMS 1790 can be interpreted as a simple update of the previous description of 
approbation, rather than a change of mind. The man of Wn is the same as the man of 
the various editions of TMS. The mechanisms through which he gains approbation 
are the same in TMS 1759 and in Wn, TMS 1790 presenting a more complete 
account of it than TMS 1759. The differences appear as a synergic point when the 
two books in their various editions are read together. reading TMS and Wn together 
allows one to interpret Smith as explaining that approbation derives both from 
appropriate moral conduct and from wealth, but that enough wealth can trump moral 
conduct in achieving approbations and can generate social malfunctions. The 
strength of the incentives in poor pre-commercial societies is different from the 
strength of the incentives in rich commercial societies and as a consequence 
behaviors and consequences will differ. The apparent contrast between the two 
editions of TMS can therefore be interpreted as only apparent. 
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